-
1 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
-
2 замечать
(= заметить, обнаруживать, указывать, отмечать) observe, note, notice, mark• Более общие условия здесь не будут обсуждаться, однако мы можем заметить, что... - More general conditions will not be discussed here, but it may be said that...• Более простой подход получается, если заметить, что... - A simpler approach is to observe that...• Были замечены первые значительные изменения в... - The first significant changes in... were detected/were observed.• В качестве последнего предостережения следует заметить, что... - As a final caveat it should be noted that...• В связи с данной задачей стоит заметить, что... - In connection with this problem it is worth noting that...• В связи с этим мы замечаем, что... - In this connection, we observe that...• Вдобавок мы можем заметить как следствие соотношения (1), что... - Incidentally we may notice, as a consequence of (1), that...• Внимательный читатель заметит, что... - An alert reader will have noticed that...• Во-вторых, мы должны заметить относительно использования (чего-л)... - Secondly, we must comment on the use of...• Во-вторых, следует заметить, что... - In the second place, it should be noted that...• Во-первых, заметим, что нет необходимости... - Our first observation is that there is no need to...• Все, что необходимо - это заметить, что... - All that is necessary is to observe that...• Дополнительное соотношение может получено, если мы заметим, что... - An additional relation can be obtained by noting that...• Довольно интересно заметить, что... - It is of some interest to observe that...• Желая использовать соотношение (14), мы заметим, что... - Wishing to exploit (14), we note that...• Заметим еще раз следующее важное обстоятельство. - Now again, we wish to make an important point.• Заметим мимоходом, что... - We observe in passing that...• Заметим, во-вторых, что... - Another point to be noticed is that...• Заметьте особую природу... - Note the singular nature of...• Заметьте различные роли, которые выполняются (чем-л). - Notice the different roles played by...• Заметьте, что данная аргументация весьма сходна (с той, что)... - Note that the present argument is very similar to...• Заметьте, что мы все еще должны быть осторожны (относительно, с)... - Note that we still must be cautious about...• Заметьте, что мы использовали (здесь) только... - Note that we have only used...• Заметьте, что мы не можем позволить себе пренебречь... - Notice that we could not afford to neglect...• Заметьте, что необходимо (сделать что-л)... - Notice that it is necessary to...• Заметьте, что это (выражение и т. п.) имеет ту же самую форму, что и... - Note that this is of the same form as...• Заметьте, что это весьма похоже на... - Note that this is very similar to...• Заметьте, что этот вывод не ограничен (чем-л). - Notice that this derivation is not restricted to...• Здесь мы просто заметим, что... - Here we will merely note that...• Интересно заметить, что... - It is interesting to observe that...; It is of interest to observe that...; It is of interest to remark that...• Как легко заметить... - As will readily be observed...; As is easy to see...• Кстати, заметим, что... - Notice incidentally that...• Между тем достаточно заметить, что... - Meanwhile, it is enough to note that...• Мы немедленно заметим, что... - It will be seen at once that...• Мы только заметим, что... - We mention in passing that...• Мы уже замечали, что... - We have already called attention to...• Наблюдательный читатель (обязательно) заметит, что... - The observant reader will have noticed that...• Не будет замечено никаких изменений. - No changes will be perceived.• Необходимо заметить, что в той же мере важным является тот факт, что... - But equally important, one should notice, is the fact that...• Необходимо заметить, что существуют два способа, которыми... - It should be noted that there are two ways in which...• Однако Смит [1] замечает, что определенные исключения действительно существуют. - But Smith [l] notes that certain exceptions do exist.• Однако интересно заметить, что... - It is, however, of interest to observe that...• Однако необходимо заметить, что... - It must be observed, however, that...• Однако следует также заметить, что... - It should also be noted, however, that...• Особенно интересно заметить, что... - It is especially interesting to note that...• Особо следует заметить, что... - It should be noted especially that...• Относительно соотношения (12) заметим, что его интересным свойством является... - The interesting feature to notice about (12) is that...• Очень полезно заметить, что... - It is very useful to notice that...• Прежде всего мы заметим, что... - Our first step is to notice that...• Перед тем как продолжить, заметим, что... - Before proceeding, we observe that...• Похоже, что Смит [1] был первым, кто заметил, что... - Smith [1] seems to have been the first to notice that...• Похоже, что остальные физики не заметили этого. - This seems to have escaped the notice of other physicists.• Прежде чем проделать это, мы заметим, что... - Before we do so we note that...• Прежде чем выполнить эту процедуру, заметим, что... - Before carrying out this procedure, note that...• Прежде чем мы продолжим изложение, стоит заметить, что... - Before we go further, it is worth observing that...• Прежде чем рассматривать их подробно, следует заметить, что... - Before considering these in detail, it should be mentioned that...• С другой стороны, мы можем заметить, что... - Alternatively, we may observe that...• С самого начала мы замечаем, что... - At the outset we notice that...• С целью дальнейшего использования заметим здесь... - Let us note here, for future use,...• С этой целью (= для этого) мы заметим, что... - То this end (= For this purpose) we note that...• Следует заметить, что... - It should be noted that...• Следующим шагом отметим, что п = 2, тогда... - Next observe that n = 2 then...• Смитом [1] первым заметил, что... - It was first observed by Smith [1] that...• Сначала заметим, что А = В. - Note first that A = В.• Стоит заметить, что... - It is worth remarking that...; It is worth noticing that...; It is noteworthy that...• Хорошо подготовленный читатель немедленно заметит, что... - The knowledgeable reader will see at once that...• Читатель мог бы заметить близкое сходство между этим анализом и... - The reader may notice a close similarity between this analysis and...• Читатель мог уже заметить, что... - The reader may have noticed that...• Чтобы доказать обратное, достаточно заметить, что... - То prove the converse it is sufficient to notice that...• Чтобы разъяснить этот момент, мы заметим, что... - То elucidate the point, we notice that...• Эта модификация, возможно, вводится наиболее просто, если заметить, что... - This modification is perhaps most easily introduced by observing that...• Это задание облегчается, если заметить, что... - This task is made easier by noticing that... -
3 Ideas
I never wrote or concluded that the mind required innate ideas which were in some sort different from its faculty of thinking; but when I observed the existence in me of certain thoughts which proceeded, not from extraneous objects nor from the determination of my will, but solely from the faculty of thinking which is within me, then... I termed [these] "innate." (Descartes, 1955, p. 442)[S]imple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us.... Thus, the idea of whiteness or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can or ought to have with things without us.... [However], all our complex ideas except those of substances being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of anything, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything by its dislikeness to it; and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas: which... are combinations of ideas which the mind by its free choice puts together without considering any connection they have in nature. (Locke, 1956, B. IV, Chap. 4, Sec. 5)[O]ur moral ideas as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas, all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures. (Locke, 1956, B. IV, Chap. 4, Sec. 7)Ideas... are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 90, pp. 63-64)The empiricists were right to believe that facts and ideas are significantly connected, but they inverted the relationship. Ideas create information, not the other way around. Every fact grows from an idea; it is the answer to a question we could not ask in the first place if an idea had not been invented which isolated some portion of the world, made it important, focused our attention, and stimulated inquiry. (Roszak, 1994, p. 105)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Ideas
См. также в других словарях:
epistemology — epistemological /i pis teuh meuh loj i keuhl/, adj. epistemologically, adv. epistemologist, n. /i pis teuh mol euh jee/, n. a branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge. [1855 60; < Gk… … Universalium
Phenomenalism — In epistemology and the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects do not exist as things in themselves but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli (e.g. redness, hardness, softness, sweetness, etc.)… … Wikipedia
Native American music — Introduction music of the indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere. The Americas contain hundreds of native communities, each with its own distinctive history, language, and musical culture. These communities although united in placing… … Universalium
Direct and indirect realism — Direct realism argues we perceive the world directly For representationalism in the arts, see Realism (visual arts). The question of direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, arises in the philosophy of… … Wikipedia
Peace — [ Gari Melchers, Mural of Peace, 1896.] Peace, in the modern usage, is a concept defined by the ideal state of relationship as absence of hostility, at the international level, that of a war. Derived from the Anglo Norman pas c.1140, and meaning… … Wikipedia
Berkeley, George — (1685 1753) An empiricist philosopher, and Bishop of Cloyne from 1734 to 1752, Berkeley is now known chiefly not for his sermons and ecclesiastical works or even for his strange writings on tar water, but rather for his philosophical works, in… … Christian Philosophy
idealism — Any doctrine holding that reality is fundamentally mental in nature. The boundaries of such a doctrine are not firmly drawn: for example, the traditional Christian view that God is a sustaining cause, possessing greater reality than his creation … Philosophy dictionary
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge — wikisourcepar|A Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Commonly called Treatise when referring to Berkeley s works) is a 1710 work by the Irish Empiricist philosopher George… … Wikipedia
Christianity — /kris chee an i tee/, n., pl. Christianities. 1. the Christian religion, including the Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox churches. 2. Christian beliefs or practices; Christian quality or character: Christianity mixed with pagan elements; … Universalium
Berkeley, George — George Berkeley David Berman BACKGROUND AND EARLY WORK George Berkeley was born on 12 March 1685 in Co. Kilkenny, where he spent his early years. His father was from England, his mother (very probably) was born in Ireland.1 After attending… … History of philosophy
Sophists (The) — The sophists G. B. Kerferd In the fifth century BC the term sophistēs was used in Greece as a name to designate a particular profession, that of certain travelling teachers who went from city to city giving lectures and providing instruction in a … History of philosophy
